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COMPETITION, COMPETITORS, AND THE POLITICAL LIMITS
OF THE SUPREME COURT'S CLAYTON § 7 POLICY
I. Introduction
Although § 7 of the Clayton Act has come to serve as the principal antitrust
weapon for attacking corporate mergers and acquisitions, there has yet to be a
clear or authoritative statement of that section's scope. This was recently em-
phasized by Mr. Justice Douglas' impassioned plea for the Supreme Court to
review § 7's application to the purer forms of a so-called conglomerate merger
so that it might discover the outer limits of § 7.2 Section 7 does not expressly
forbid all mergers and acquisitions but only those which tend substantially to
lessen competition. Since the acquiring and acquired firms in a conglomerate
merger have "no discernible relationship," 3 it is not obvious how the merger
might tend substantially to lessen competition-at least as that term is ordinarily
understood.' Any determination of the legality of a conglomerate merger would
require the Court to define exactly what competition as used in § 7 means. By
attempting such a definition, the Court could conceptually clarify the present
purposes of antitrust policy and the present limiti of existing antitrust laws as an
effective curb on the growth of capital concentration.
This article attempts to suggest the need for such a clarification by examin-
ing the confusion in the Court's principal opinions on § 7 and the political sources
of that confusion. There exists already, of course, an excess of information about
§ 7 and the conglomerate phenomenon. By way of introducing yet another
discussion, an observation may be in order. Most writing on antitrust law draws
its critical perspective from the discipline of microeconomic analysis. That is
understandable since the antitrust statutes, and particularly § 7, attempt to
regulate an economic order. Nonetheless, that perspective poses a serious prob-
lem of method. Antitrust policy cannot depend upon economic analysis of the
academic sort precisely because antitrust laws propose to limit economics or
commerce to ends set by the political or legal order. Therefore any economic
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
2 Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 418 U.S. 919, 922 (1974) (Douglas,J., dissenting). See also United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 639 (1974);
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 583 (1967).
3 H.R. RnsP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949) referred to three types of mergers
and acquisitions covered by the 1950 amendments to § 7: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate.
"Horizontal acquisitions are those in which the firms involved are engaged in roughly similar
lines of endeavor; vertical acquisitions are those in which the purchase represents a movement
either backward or forward toward the ultimate consumer; and conglomerate acquisitions are
those in which there is no discernible relationship in the nature of the business between the
acquiring and the acquired firms." See also The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 FTC 1465, 1542-45(1963); E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 211-220 (1973); and note 45 infra.
4 See, e.g., Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-1960, 51 Am. EcoN. REv. 236, 243 (May
1961); Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-
Merger Act, 68 COLUm. L. Fav. 1231, 1237-38 (1968); ill, The Trend Toward Social Com-
petition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 54 Gao. L.J. 891, 906-07 (1966); Goldberg, The
Effect of Conglomerate Mergers on Competition, 16 J. LAw & EcoN. 137, 158 (1973); Mark-
ham, Antitrust and the Conglomerate: A Policy in Search of a Theory, 44 ST. JOHN's L. Ray.
90, 130-31 (Special Ed. 1970); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HAav. L. Rav. 1313, 1394-95 (1965).
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theory's utility for antitrust policy depends upon the relevance of its critical
assumptions to the larger ends of political life. When assessing the Supreme
Court's antitrust policies, then, the crucial perspective must be political: The
question is not whether the Court's opinions correspond to the latest micro-
economic theories of price and firm behavior, but whether the Court's economics
ultimately correspond to the political concerns which define the place of eco-
nomics in the American polity. This observation should explain certain obvious
limits of this article: It neither exhaustively surveys § 7 case law nor analyzes in
detail any particular case; rather it merely suggests the need for rethinking the
purposes of § 7 by indicating the obvious, political limits of the Court's opinions.
II. The Basic Doctrine
A. The Statute
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital, and no
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets, of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.5
What those words mean, much less their purpose, is greatly disputed. The dis-
pute is complicated in large part because § 7 was amended in 1950 to correct
apparent defects in the wording of the 1914 act. The original § 7 forbade only
stock acquisitions which might substantially lessen competition between the
acquiring and acquired companies; it was silent about asset acquisitions, mergers,
and consolidations as well as about the more remote competitive effects of such
acquisitions. The 1950 amendments clearly indicate by their language that Con-
gress intended to expand the scope of the 1914 act; the problem is how and why.
The express language of the amended § 7 makes at least this much clear:
Section 7 applies to every corporate merger or acquisition whatever its form,
but it invalidates only those mergers whose effect might be substantially to lessen
competition in a relevant product ("line of commerce") or geographic ("section
of the country") market. How far § 7's scope was expanded depends upon the
interpretation given the key, but undefined terms: competition, substantially,
and market. The case law on § 7 reflects the equivocity and hence the various
possibilities of those words.
B. The Definitive Cases
The Supreme Court first attempted a systematic interpretation of amended
§ 7 in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,6 which invalidated a merger between
5 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
6 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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two companies engaged in the manufacturing and retailing of shoes. The merger
created a company accounting for approximately 5 percent of the market, and
resulted in some horizontal and vertical integration between the companies.'
While there was evidence of some increase in concentration within the industry,
by usual standards the industry was not oligopolistic: The 24 largest manu-
facturers produced only 35 percent of the shoes, the top four but 23 percent 3
Since these facts hardly suggested that the merged firm would or could
dominate competition, the merger's validity obviously depended upon how the
Court would choose to interpret the terms "competition" and "substantial." In
accordance with a respectable principle of interpreting antitrust statutes, the
Court could have read the statutory language in its ordinary or traditional sense,
without reliance upon the legislative history of the 1950 amendments.' Had it
attended to the statute's language, the Court could properly have claimed that
the 1950 amendments intended only to enlarge the number of mergers covered
by § 7, not to change the test of illegality, because both the 1914 act and the
1950 amendments use identical language to describe the standard for evaluating
mergers. Since the language of both acts was identical, pre-1950 case law could
serve to interpret the phrase "substantially to lessen competition." On that basis
the merger most probably would have been legal."0
Despite the identical language, the Court chose to argue that the 1950
amendments significantly changed the test for § 7 violations. This required the
Court to circumvent the obvious meaning of the statutory language. To discover
a new test, the Court resorted to the legislative history and discovered certain
paramount concerns pervading Congressional debate on the 1950 amendments.
First and dominant was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of eco-
nomic concentration in the American economy. This was coupled with a desire
to retain "local control" over business and to protect small businesses 1 In short,
Congress was concerned with economic concentration but not only on "economic
grounds"; it was as much concerned with "the threat to other values" which
economic concentration was thought to pose.12
That conclusion from the legislative history posed an obvious problem: The
statute neither mentions concentration or small businesses nor does it include an
express statement of policy suggesting its political concerns. The only statutory
criterion for distinguishing good from bad mergers is their effect on competition.
If the Court's legislative history were correct, Congress must have understood
7 370 U.S. at 302-04.
8 370 U.S. at 300; compare 370 U.S. at 374 n. 9.
9 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897).
10 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930) (merger legal because
only 5% of the firms' products were sold in competition); Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v.
FTC, 65 F.2d 336 (2nd Cir. 1933), rev'd on other grounds, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). H.R. Rap. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 7-8 (1949) cited International Shoe to illustrate the proper test for whether a merger
substantially lessened competition. This example illustrates how easily legislative history can be
used for a variety of purposes. See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 285(1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
11 370 U.S. at 315-16. Compare Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARv. L. Rv. 226, 233-38 (1960) with Note, Conglomerate Mergers under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1265, 1278 (1963).
12 370 U.S. at 316.
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competition in some extraordinary sense. Here the facts of Brown Shoe become
relevant. By commonsense standards, the shoe industry was neither highly con-
centrated nor substantially uncompetitive. While there had been some decline
in the number of competitors, the statistics were not conclusive. 3 The Court's
response to this commonsense observation reveals the policy governing its appli-
cation of § 7. The statute does not require that a merger have actual effects on
competition; it requires only that the merger's effect "may be" to affect com-
petition. Congress intended § 7 to arrest mergers "when the trend to a lessening
of competition ... was still in its incipiency."'" The concern was with "prob-
abilities, not certainties.""5
The claim that § 7 deals with competitive effects in their incipiency responds
skillfully to the commonsense objections because it removes the commonsense
limits to the word "competition." If § 7 is concerned with incipient dangers to
competition, an examination of actual competitive effects would not discover
violations; the Court must predict what might happen to competition as a result
of an acquisition. But prediction requires a standard against which forbidden
effects can be measured before they actually affect competition. That standard,
the Court claimed, existed in the legislative history. By adopting the incipiency
test, Congress demonstrated a concern with trends toward concentration and
numbers of competitors, not with competition. Thus, what seemed to many the
most curious statement in Brown Shoe in fact most accurately represents the
Court's political understanding of § 7. While the statutory language suggests
congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors, Con-
gress desired to "promote competition through the protection of viable, small,
locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization."' 6 In
short, "competition" as used in the statute meant "competitors" as discussed in
the legislative history.
Nowhere is there a better illustration of the political limits of the Court's
economics. Though it refers frequently to the results of certain economic analyses
13 As Justice Harlan pointed out, there was hardly any clear evidence of a trend toward
concentration. There had been a decline in the number of shoe manufacturers between 1947 and
1956, but there was no increase in the concentration ratios for the largest firms during the same
period. 370 U.S. at 374 n.9.
14 370 U.S. at 317. See also United States v. DuPont, 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).
15 370 U.S. at 323. It must be noted that "incipiency" has no analytical significance; it is
a conclusory term. As the Court's legislative history uses the word, it means more than an
ephemeral possibility but less than a full-fledged violation of the Sherman Act. Compare 370 U.S.
at 318 n.32 with 370 U.S. at 323 n.39.
16 370 U.S. at 344; compare 370 U.S. at 320: "Taken as a whole, the legislative history
illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors, and its
desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen competi-
tion." (Emphasis in original.) See also Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
4 (1958) : "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise
that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our eco-
nomic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while
at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic
political and social institutions." Compare Kristol, Republican Virtue v. Servile Institutions,
8 THE ALTFRNATVE 5, 6 (No. 5, 1975): "[The Founding Fathers] judged an economic system,
not merely by whether or not it improved one's standard of living, but also by what it did to the
character of the people who participated in that system."
[April 1975]
[Vol. 50:693]
to support its holding, the Court's holding is in fact almost wholly dictated by
its understanding of the political purposes of § 7. Were the Court really interested
in economic competition, it might have wondered whether small local businesses
could any longer compete in the modem shoe industry-not because the larger
firms competed unfairly but because competitive conditions had changed.17 That
would be a necessary enquiry for a strictly economic investigation, but the Court
had adopted a concept of competition whose substance was political, not eco-
nomic. Its economic analysis subserves it political end. Thus, though the lan-
guage in Brown can be read to respect a need to balance the interests of com-
petitors and competition, the Court's heart and its holding had clearly chosen
competitors, not competition as the end of § 7; or, more accurately, its political
understanding of § 7 defined competition in terms of competitors18 Though this
might not have been clear from a cursory reading of Brown, it was obvious to
anyone who remembered that the opinion was written by Mr. Chief Justice
Warren who, dissenting in DuPont, had insisted that competitive structure deter-
mined competitive behavior," or for anyone who attempted to coordinate the
Court's holding with the economic facts it was called upon to analyze. 20
Having defined these political limits to economics, the Court's principal
task after Brown was to devise a conceptual foundation for its view that com-
petition really meant competitors and that only a concern for competitors would
properly reflect the spirit, if not the letter, of the statute. That foundation was
presented in the next important § 7 case, United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank.z1
Recalling Brown's conclusion that the 1950 amendments reflected a prin-
cipally political concern with economic concentration, the Court concluded that
this concern would sometimes warrant dispensing "with elaborate proof of market
structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitiue effects" 22 Where a mer-
ger produces "a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant
market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market," the Court would presume that the merger is "so inherently likely to
lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined.... 2 , 3 This new test,
the Court insisted, is "fully consonant with economic theory. That '[c]ompetition
is likely to be greatest when there are many sellers, none of which has significant
market share,' is common ground among most economists and was undoubtedly
a premise of congressional reasoning about the antimerger statute."24
17 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 283-92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
18 The Court did emphasize that it would be necessary to view a merger functionally, "in
the context of its particular industry"; and that courts must take care not to consider selected
economic data at the expense of a thorough study of the relevant product and geographic
markets. 370 U.S. at 320-22. This caused some to misunderstand Brown's real teaching. See
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 282 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
19 United States v. DuPont, 351 U.S. 377, 426 (1956) (Warren, C. J., dissenting).
20 See note 13 supra.
21 374U.S. 321 (1963).
22 Id. at 363 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546,
552-53 (1966) ; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 78 (10th Cir. 1972).
23 374 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added).
24 Id. But see Oppenheim, Antitrust Booms and Boomerangs, 59 Nw. U.L. R!v. 33,
43 n.41 (1964): "Mhe proposition that oligopoly competition is less effective than competition
among a large number of sellers is not the consensus among economists."
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Though this statement confirms the Court's political concerns, it hardly
offers a new § 7 test; or, more accurately, by itself it resolves no § 7 problems
because it depends upon two undefined terms: "undue" percentage of the
market and "significant" increase in concentration. The Court could establish
neither of these factors any more easily than it could establish the substantial
anticompetitive effects required before Brown and Philadelphia." The Court
merely substituted one problematic standard for another; but the substituted
standard departed significantly from the statutory language. Yet, after this exer-
cise in judicial creativity, the Court astonishingly insisted that any merger which
violated the Court's new standard could not be saved "because, on some ulti-
mate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed bene-
ficial. A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial
competence, and in any event has been made for us already, by Congress when
it enacted the amended § 726
It is important to recognize what the Court has done. First, in Brown, the
Court constructed a legislative history which proclaimed that amended § 7's
fundamental purpose was to halt in its incipiency any trend toward economic
concentration, even though concentration was not mentioned in the statute.
Then, in Philadelphia National Bank, the Court proclaimed that this purpose
required it to replace a thorough economic analysis of competitive effects with
a single test, market concentration, even if that test might invalidate certain
competitive or otherwise socially or economically desirable mergers. Arguably
the merger in Philadelphia National Bank may have had anticompetitive effects
even using traditional tests since there was some evidence that the merged firm
might dominate the legally defined market,2" but the Court was looking beyond
the immediate merger. The Court suggested its true intention in its famous
footnote 42:
It is no answer that, among the three presently largest firms..., there will
be no increase in concentration. If this argument were valid, then once a
market had become unduly concentrated, further concentration would be
legally privileged. On the contrary, if concentration is already great, the
importance of preventing even slight increases in concentration and so
preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly
great.28
25 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 284 n.6, 286-87 (1966) (Stewart,J., dissenting). On the limits of concentration analysis, see E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
154-55 (1969); FTC Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation, 1976 Budget Overview, No. 692
ATRR, pp. E2-E4 (12-10-74); H. DEmS-Tz, T mJ MAIxET CONCENTRATION DocTRINF (1973).
26 374 U.S. at 371.
27 If we accept the Court's market determinations, after the merger, the two largest banks
would have controlled either 44% or 59% of the banking business in the relevant area. 374 U.S.
at 364-65. There was evidence, however, that the Court engaged in significant gerrymandering
to achieve the desired results, and therefore that the legally defined market was commercially
irrelevant. 374 U.S. at 359-60. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441,
469-70, 476 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) on the Court's "bizarre" calculations of "non-
existent" markets: "The Court's spurious market share analysis should not obscure the fact that
the Court is, in effect, laying down a 'per se' rule that mergers between two large companies in
related industries are presumptively unlawful under § 7." See also Rill, supra note 4, at 904-05;
Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments- 1964, 63 MIcH. L. Rav. 59, 70-78 (1964).
28 374 U.S. at 365 n. 42.
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Because its concern for competition was political, the Court turned its atten-
tion almost exclusively to concentration; but its concern for concentration re-
flected its desire to preserve competitors. The concern for competitors changes
the Court's role from the protector of competition to the promoter of deconcen-
tration in order to protect small competitors.
The effect of this new concern is perhaps best reflected in United States v.
Von's Grocery Co. 9 Politically and economically, Von's was a perfect case for
a Court desirous of extending the political understanding of § 7's purpose to its
limits. Von's, a leading grocery chain, acquired a principal competitor; the
merged firms accounted for 7.5 percent of the grocery sales in the relevant
market. This combination occurred at a time when the number of small grocery
stores was decreasing and the number of large chains was increasing. The Court
found that the merger violated § 7 principally because in the grocery market
there was "a long and continuous trend toward fewer and fewer owner-com-
petitors"-"exactly the sort of trend which Congress, with power to do so, de-
ched must be arrested."' 0 The Court rejected Von's defense that the "grocery
market was competitive before the merger, has been since, and may continue to
be in the future,"31 because § 7 required the Court to predict future effects on
competition, not to assess competition as it presently exists. "It is enough for
us that Congress feared that a market marked at the same time by both a con-
tinuous decline in the number of small businesses and a large number of mergers
would slowly but inevitably gravitate from a market .of many small competitors
to one dominated by one or a few giants, and competition would thereby be
destroyed. 3 2 This, the Court insisted, was the real meaning of its cases inter-
preting § 7-'
Justice Stewart's dissent eliminated any possible doubt that the purpose of
the majority's doctrine was political. Sound economic analysis, he argued, would
demonstrate that the relevant grocery market was unthreatened by concentration;
that local competition was "vigorous to a fault," not only among the chain stores
themselves but also between chain stores and the single-store operators; that there
was "a surfeit of business opportunity for stores of all sizes."' The majority was
interested not in economic analysis, but in using § 7 as "a charter to roll back
the supermarket revolution" and preserve Mom and Pop grocery stores that were
"now economically and technologically obsolete in many parts of the country."' 5
In effect, the majority was attempting to "mold the food economy of today into
the market pattern of another era." 6 To achieve this political purpose the major-
29 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
30 384 U.S. at 278.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. See also United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551-53 (1966), which
invalidated a merger resulting in a firm controlling 4.49% of nationwide sales in a market where
there was a "marked" decline in the number of brewers.
34 384 U.S. at 287-88.
35 384 U.S. at 288. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962);
Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. Rnv. 363, 368 (1965); Bork, Antitrust
in Dubious Battle, 44 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 663, 707-16 (Special Ed. 1970); Adelman, supra
note 4, at 243.
36 384 U.S. at 289. See Rill, supra note 4, at 899-901.
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ity expanded the incipiency test to reach mergers which no longer had a "reason-
able probability" but only a "mere possibility" of lessening competition."
Justice Stewart was only partially correct. The Court continued to use a
reasonable probability test to judge whether anticompetitive effects were sub-
stantial for § 7 purposes; but it had adopted an economic theory which allowed
any possibility to be considered a reasonable probability. If many small com-
petitors meant more competition,3 8 even a slight decrease in competitors might
have a substantial effect on competition. If this was not sufficient to make a
mere possibility a reasonable probability for § 7 purposes, the incipiency doctrine
allowed the Court to predict future market conditions by projecting present
concentration trends into the future. 9 This virtually guaranteed the probability
of a future "unduly" concentrated market.
Since the Court's economics enabled it to find that virtually every merger
had "substantial" anticompetitive effects, it is important to understand the
foundation for those economics. When the Court introduced its new standard,
it did so without further explanation because, it claimed, most economists agreed
that competition would be greatest when there are many sellers, none of which
has any significant market share."0 But the Court relied upon statements made
in reference to a "pure competition" microeconomic model used to study the
effects of certain isolated pricing practices. By definition, there is perfect com-
petition when there is a large number of firms, each sufficiently small so that it
cannot influence the market, manufacturing products identical not only in
physical characteristics but in the minds of consumers. Thus, the microeconomic
perfect competition model abstracts from the distinctive traits of individual firms
and products: price competition, advertising, brand names, economies of scale,
selling costs, local advantages, innovation.4 But common sense, and most busi-
nessmen, would regard these factors as the essence of a competitive commercial
market. Moreover, the Court not only chose an abstract, and therefore irrelevant,
economic model as the § 7 standard for competition, it also chose an equally
abstract oligopoly model to characterize the supposed anticompetitive effects of
the projected postmerger markets. Whatever its utility to microeconomists, that
model hardly described the real competitive forces of commercial markets. The
Court clearly knew this. The law review article the Court used as its principal
economic authority frankly stated that, if anything, economists agreed only that
no model had yet been devised to evaluate the competitive tendencies of the real
multiproduct, multiplant firms which competed in actual commercial markets.
Just because the econometrists could not predict which mergers might adversely
37 384 U.S. at 285; see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-23 (1962);
United States v. DuPont, 353 U.S. 586, 598 (1957).
38 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
39 See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501-03 (1974), and text
accompanying note 92 infra.
40 374 U.S. at 363.
41 See P. AscH, EcoNoMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 9-13 (1970); REPORT
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
316-320 (1955); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 602-03 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 FTC 1465, 1549 (1963), and the sources cited
there at n.19.
[April 1975]
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affect competition, the article recommended that courts not allow efficiency to be
used as a defense to § 7 complaints."
The Court's willingness to adopt abstract economic models in spite of their
admitted significant limitations suggests the extent to which politics, not econom-
ics, ordered the Court's initial interpretation of § 7. It is important to recognize
this political concern because it alone explains why, economically at least, the
"sole consistency" Justice Stewart could find in the Court's § 7 opinions was
that "the Government always wins." 43
III. The Doctrine Expands: Potential Competition
Brown and succeeding § 7 cases perceived the principal concern of the 1950
Clayton Act amendments to be the political problems caused by an increasing
trend toward concentration and a corresponding decline in the number of small
competitors in the American economy. The Court attempted to deal with this
political problem by adopting a method of economic analysis which allowed
it to enjoin politically undesirable mergers on § 7 grounds because that method
identified competition with the number and size of competitors. These economics
allowed the Court to achieve indirectly the perceived political end of § 7 within
the limits of the statutory language. That method of analysis served the Court's
intentions tolerably well" so long as the contested mergers were obviously hori-
zontal or vertical. A horizontal merger actually eliminates a competitor from
the market; a vertical merger replaces a free competitor with a captive com-
petitor and therefore potentially forecloses competition in some part of the
market. In both instances there exists data which can plausibly serve to show
the increase in market concentration and decline in numbers of competitors
necessary to suggest a probability that competition will be lessened substantially.
This method is less useful, however, if the merger is of the more exotic con-
glomerate type where the acquiring and acquired firms share no common
markets.4 5 Because such a merger neither increases any firm's share of the market
nor forecloses any firm from a market or from sources of supply, there is, ap-
parently, only a change of competitors. But there is no commonsense reason
why a change of competitors might not as well increase as decrease competition.
As Judge Friendly aptly remarked: "Introducing a bull into a china shop is a
good way to break through the comfortable vices of oligopoly."" Yet it was
42 Note, supra note 11, at 1658-59 (1969). See also Bok, supra note 11, at 312 n.261;
Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J. LAw & ECON. 54 (1958).
43 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44 This is to say only that the Court less frequently had to distort the actual economic data
in order to achieve its political purpose. See notes 27 and 13 supra.
45 The Courts have discovered three types of these more exotic § 7 mergers: (1) the pure
conglomerate merger described in the legislative history (see note 3 supra); (2) a geographic-
extension merger where the merging companies produce or sell the same products, but do so in
different product markets, United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964);
and (3) a product-extension merger where the merging companies produce or distribute func-
tionally related products, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
46 Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 860 (2d Cir. 1974). See
ABA, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 84 (1968) ; Note, United States v. Falstaff Brewing
Corporation: Potential Competition Re-examined, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 837, 848-52 (1974); Gold-
berg, supra note 4, at 158; Markham, supra note 4, at 289: "[V]irtually any pronouncement
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precisely such mergers which most threatened to increase economic concentration
and thus create the very vices which Brown declared § 7 was designed to prevent.
To achieve § 7's design, as discovered by Brown, the Court needed to develop
new criteria for analyzing the competitive significance of conglomerate mergers.
The possibilities for such new criteria were suggested by the doctrine that § 7
was intended to prevent anticompetitive mergers in their incipiency. This allowed
the Court to declare certain mergers unlawful merely because they might facilitate
certain conditions or practices which threatened to depart from the Court's ideal
of perfect competition, even though no injury to actual competition had yet
occurred. Possessing this self-endowed ability to predict potential effects on com-
petition, the Court needed only to find some justification for insisting that rather
insignificant present practices might have significant future effects on competi-
tion. It found that justification in the same academic doctrine which allowed
it to deduce anticompetitive effects from concentration ratios. Using academic
oligopoly models, the Court discovered certain situations which would probably
violate § 7: (1) the elimination as a potential competitor of a firm which enters
the relevant market through acquisition,47 (2) the possibility that an acquiring
firm might exercise its power in its own market through implied threats or
promises of reciprocity, forcing its suppliers to deal with or purchase from an
acquired firm,48 or (3) the effect on a market that the size and wealth of a new
entrant might have.49 Underlying and informing each of these concerns was the
hope that by forbidding certain mergers the Court might preserve deconcen-
tration in the relevant markets.50 As the Court faced new, but less obviously
anticompetitive challenges to its established § 7 doctrine, these considerations
moved increasingly to the center of the Court's opinion.
Because there exists ample discussion of these specific tests, 1 there is little
need to describe them in detail. It is important, however, to indicate the reason
the Court adopted them for § 7 analysis. That reason will appear from a state-
ment of the academic foundation of the Court's potential competition theories"
and the political purposes those theories were intended to serve.53
concerning conglomerate enterprise is more likely to reveal the personal sentiments of the
individual who makes it than factually or theoretically valid generalizations on how conglom-
erate firms operate."
47 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); United States v. Perm-
Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
48 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
49 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
50 This was the concern stated in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 365 n42 (1963), and frequently reaffirmed. While no case has relied exclusively on this
consideration as a basis for holding a merger unlawful, it informs most of the decisions. See, e.g.,
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972); The Bendix Corp., [1970-
1973 Transfer Binder] TRAr- REG. REP. 19,288 (FTC 1970); Beatrice Foods, [1965-1967
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REn. 17,244 at 22,335 (FTC 1965).
51 See the articles collected at notes 4, 35, 41, 59.
52 The use of the single term "potential competition" to describe and condemn supposedly,
but less obviously, anticompetitive mergers is somewhat misleading because it confuses two
different supposed threats to competition. But it was just this confusion which greatly assisted
the Court in its attempt to expand the scope of § 7. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 558-62 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring), and the text accompanying
notes 70-72 infra.
53 For an excellent survey of the Supreme Court's potential competition cases see Brief for
Comptroller of the Currency at 62-90, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602
(1974), reprinted in 7 LAW REPRINTS, TRADn REGULATION SERims 382-410 (No. 6 1974).
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The sources and purposes of the potential competition doctrine can be best
illustrated by FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.," in which the Court declared that
Procter's acquisition of Clorox violated § 7. Clorox was the leading manufacturer
and only national marketer of household liquid bleach. Procter was the largest
seller of soaps and detergents marketed and used in connection with liquid bleach,
but Procter had never manufactured or sold liquid bleach.55 Although both
firms competed in a broad market for household cleansing agents, the Court
decided to define the relevant § 7 line of commerce narrowly to include only
household liquid bleach."6 Because Procter did not actively participate in this
market, the merger posed conceptual problems for a Court used to relying on
structural tests to demonstrate competitive consequences, especially since the
Court had insisted that all mergers must be tested by the same § 7 standard5
If Procter did not directly compete with Clorox, the acquisition would neither
disturb concentration ratios nor eliminate competitors--the traditional tests for
adverse effects on competition. Convinced that the merger violated § 7, the
Court determined that new tests were necessary.5" It found those tests in the
academic theory of oligopoly behavior.
Simply stated, the theory claimed that oligopolists would not dominate their
markets as viciously as they might if they had reason to fear potential competitors
anxiously awaiting an opportunity to enter the market. To exclude those po-
tential competitors and maintain their dominance, the oligopolists attempted to
raise anticompetitive barriers to entry, principally by means of limit pricing and
artificial, or excessive, product differentiation. Limit pricing supposedly occurs
because oligopolists weigh the possibility of attracting new entrants before they
make price and output decisions. Since the entry of new competitors could detri-
mentally affect profit margins, the oligopolist limits his prices to a point which
will deter new entrants but above the point where it would be set in a perfectly
competitive market. Thus, while they do not provide the full beneficial effects
of an actual competitor, potential competitors significantly benefit competition
by forcing prices lower than they might otherwise be. As an alternative or in
addition to limit pricing, oligopolists supposedly raise anticompetitive barriers to
new entry by artificially increasing the costs of competition. Although there are
certain competitive or necessary barriers to entry such as economies of scale, the
academic oligopoly theories claimed that the most significant barriers to entry
were posed by product differentiation, especially that created by large-scale
advertising.
5 9
54 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
55 386 U.S. at 572. See The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 FTC 1465, 1470, 1541 (1963).
56 386 U.S. at 571. Compare Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851,
863 (2d Cir. 1974).
57 386 U.S. at 577. See The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 FTC 1465, 1546 (1963).
58 386 U.S. at 577-78; see The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 FTC 1465, 1570-71 (1963) : "If
mergers not falling within certain familiar categories, such as 'horizontal' and 'vertical,' are to
be effectively subject to Section 7, as Congress plainly intended them to be, other means-
non-percentile and non-quantitative-of roughly, but fairly, estimating the substantiality of the
merger's probable adverse effects on competition in the relevant market must be found." Id.
59 For an elaboration see BAIN, BARRIERS TO N-w COMPETITION 33-41 (1956); Note,
Telex v. IBM, 84 YALx, L.J. 558, 562-63, 568-82 (1975); Backman, Conglomerate Mergers and
Competition, 44 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 90, 101-110 (Special Ed. 1970); Disher, Barrier Analysis
in Antitrust Law, 58 CORNELL L. Rav. 862 (1973); P. ARE=DA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 11
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Such is the theory the Court adopted and adapted. It seems a perfect tool
to expand the scope of § 7 because it greatly expands the number of firms whose
acquisitions would substantially lessen competition, even though they did not
eliminate competitors or increase market concentration. On the basis of this
theory, the Court determined that it could act to prevent mergers which might
(1) eliminate potential entrants who could discipline the market or (2) allow
entry into the market of firms with the capacity to increase anticompetitive prod-
uct differentiation." Because Procter's acquisition of Clorox might cause both
to happen, it violated § 72
Although the Court once more stated its potential competition theory as
if it were economic orthodoxy,62 the theory had significant weaknesses, both con-
ceptual and practical, which limited its utility as a test for the real commercial
world. About the product differentiation claims, little of an economic nature
need be said. The argument really depends upon a belief that large companies
can and do engage in predatory practices. But, as Justice Harlan noted in his
concurring opinion, there is simply no persuasive evidence that such predatory
practices occur, except in economic models. 3 With respect to the purported
disciplining effect of a potential entrant, there were equally obvious problems.
Economists simply did not agree that the limit pricing theory accorded with
commercial reality." Even if accepted, oligopoly theory did not necessarily
support the Court's political purposes. Bain had suggested that oligopolies main-
tained themselves because of high entry barriers; but entry barriers could be
created by real efficiencies of large-scale plant and firm or by certain government
granted monopolies such as patents and trademarks. In any case, it would be
exceedingly difficult to devise a policy for attacking concentration without ad-
versely affecting efficiency. 5 More importantly, where the high entry barriers
were caused not by efficiencies but by product differentiation, Bain suggested
117, 603, 666-67 (2d ed. 1974). Note that the theory assumes that all competitors act alike
and therefore that when a different competitor enters the market, the competitive structure
will remain unchanged. That is a necessary assumption for creating a model to test economic
hypotheses; it is hardly a necessary or true assumption about actual commercial competition.
See text accompanying note 46 supra.
60 386 U.S. at 578. There was a third possible adverse effect which the Federal Trade
Commission had emphasized but the Court did not: Procter & Gamble's ability to shift financial
resources and competitive strength through a broad front of different products and markets and
its ability to alter strategically the selected point of its greatest impact as time, place, and
market conditions required. See The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 FTC 1465, 1531-32, 1567
(1963).
61 386 U.S. at 578-79. The Court and the FTC especially emphasized Procter & Oamble's
role as an advertiser and the fact that all brands of household bleach were chemically identical.
386 U.S. at 572, 579; The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 FTC 1465, 1538-42 (1963). This
supposedly proved that there was unnecessary, i.e., uncompetitive, product differentiation and
that the acquisition would enable Procter to increase entry barriers significantly.
62 See text accompanying note 40 supra; see also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568, 582, 590 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), criticizing the majority's "res ipsa loquitur
approach to antitrust cases."
63 386 U.S. at 588. Compare, Turner, supra note 4, at 1339-52; Adelman, supra note 4, at
242; Backman, supra note 59, at 110-18.
64 Bain, supra note 59, at 206, himself admitted that his theories were based on "tentative
or only partly-tested theories" with a limited factual foundation. A key, but unfounded, assump-
tion was that "there is effective concurrence of market action by established sellers in establish-
ing some approximation to a joint-profit-maximizing price. . .. ." Id. at 33. He only "paren-
thetically" considered the possible imperfections of express or tacit collusion, but that obviously
is the most significant consideration for practical purposes. Id.
65 Bain, supra note 59, at 207.
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that it was precisely "established firms in other industries" which could best
surmount the entry barriers and bring new competition into an oligopolistic
market."6 Thus it could just as easily be argued that leading firm mergers would
encourage competition; but they would do so only by increasing the economic
concentration which the Court insisted that § 7 was designed to prevent.
Despite these obvious objections to the potential competition theory, the
Court insisted upon using it to ban certain conglomerate mergers principally
because it offered yet another opportunity to assist the small competitors whose
interests had occupied the Court since Brown. Before introducing the potential
competition theory, the Court had repeated the FTC's warning that the "prac-
tical tendency" of the Procter-Clorox merger would be "to transform the liquid
bleach industry into an arena of big business competition only, with the few
small firms that have not disappeared through merger eventually falling by the
wayside, unable to compete with their giant rivals. ' 67 Once again politics defined
the Court's economics.
Conceptual problems aside, there remained a practical difficulty which
threatened to limit significantly the potential competition theory's ability to
expand the scope of § 7. The theory presupposed that the market was already
concentrated, that a limited number of outside firms possessed the capacity and
incentive to enter the market, and that those potential competitors were per-
ceived by the actual competitors. 8 The reasons for these limits were obvious.
In an unconcentrated market, oligopoly theory did not apply by definition. If
there were many potential entrants, the loss of one through merger would be
insignificant. If the potential entrants were not perceived, there was no incentive
to limit price or otherwise raise barriers to entry.
But if the Government had to prove each of these conditions precedent to
oligopolistic behavior before it could apply its potential competition theories,
the burden of proof in a § 7 case could be insurmountable. Facing that kind of
challenge in Philadelphia National Bank, the Court had resolved to ease the
burden of proving mergers violated § 7 by relying upon concentration trends.69
It made a similar resolution in its potential competition cases. The Court decided
that there was really no need to prove actual intentions and perceptions; it would
be enough to show what should have been intended and perceived. In the place
of actual competitors, the Court injected a reasonable man into the marketplace.
This amendment to academic potential competition theory was stated in United
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp." The Government had contended that Falstaff's
acquisition of Narragansett Brewery violated § 7 because it eliminated a potential
66 Bain, supra note 59, at 215. Compare Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498
F.2d 851, 860 (2d Cir. 1974).
67 386 U.S. at 575, citing The Procter & Gamble Co., 63 FTC 1465, 1573 (1963). The
Court's political will to invalidate the merger is further suggested by the fact that the evidence
did not support the Court until the academic, but commercially unfounded, potential competi-
tion theory was adopted. The FTC twice heard the case. The first Commission rejected a find-
ing of anticompetitive effects, as did the Court of Appeals. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 570 (1967); Procter & Gamble Co. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 74, 83 (6th Cir. 1966).
68 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578-81 (1967); United States v.
Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964); and note 59 supra.
69 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
70 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
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competitor from the New England beer market. The District Court rejected this
contention because there was no significant evidence that Falstaff actually in-
tended to enter the market or that the other competitors believed Falstaff would
enter; therefore Falstaff was not in fact a potential competitor. Remanding the
case, the Supreme Court insisted that such evidence was not necessary. The
crucial question was "whether, given its financial capabilities and conditions in
the New England market, it would be reasonable to consider it a potential entrant
into that market."'" The true test should be not whether Falstaff was in fact a
potential competitor but whether it could be considered a potential competitor.
By adopting this reasonable man test, the Court completely freed the mean-
ing of "competition" in § 7 from any commonsense or commercially restrictive
restraints. Of course, reasonable still could have been interpreted to mean what
a reasonable businessman might perceive or intend; but that is not what the
Court meant. Reasonable meant what firms would do if they acted in accordance
with the Court's notions of oligopoly behavior. 2 The Court had finally achieved
an effective means of identifying competition in § 7 with competitors, even in
conglomerate merger situations.
After Falstaff the only remaining restraint which the statutory language
imposed on antitrust policy was the requirement that a merger's anticompetitive
effects appear in a relevant product or geographic market. This requirement
posed significant problems for the Justice Department in its efforts to apply § 7
to the so-called pure conglomerate merger. Because a pure conglomerate had no
permanent commitment73 to any particular market, it was a potential entrant
into every market but a probable entrant into none. Even the Court's reasonable
man could hardly insist that it was reasonable to suppose that a conglomerate
would probably have entered any specific market in the way that Falstaff would
have entered the New England beer market or Procter & Gamble the household
bleach market.
Clearly understanding the political dimensions of the Court's § 7 opinions, 4
the Justice Department attempted to remove this restraint by a new theory of §
7 articulated in five conglomerate complaints filed with the intention of giving the
Supreme Court an opportunity to test the applicability of § 7 to conglomerate
mergers.75 The gist of these complaints was that a merger between large firms
71 410 U.S. at 533.
72 410 U.S. at 533-34, 544, 548, 566-69.
73 On the importance of a "permanent commitment" to a particular industry for potential
competition theories see Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 861 (2d
Cir. 1974).
74 See Statement by Antitrust Division Chief Richard W. McLaren before the House Ways
and Means Committee, March 12, 1969, 5 TRADE REG. R P. 50,101 (1969); Address by
Attorney General John N. Mitchell before the Georgia Bar Association, June 6, 1969, 5 TRADE
REG. REP. 1 50,107 (1969); Address by Roland W. Donnem, Director of Policy Planning for
the Antitrust Division, November 10, 1969, 5 TRADE REG. REIP. 50,113 (1969); Statement by
Antitrust Division Chief Richard W. McLaren before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly, February 18, 1970, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,114 (1970). But see President's Task
Force Report on Productivity and Competition [Stigler Report], June 16, 1969, 5 TRADE REG.
RaP. 50,108 (1969).
75 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D.Conn. 1969)
(Grinnell Corp.) (decided with United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. [Hartford Fire
Ins. Co.]); United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D.Ill. 1969);
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., [1961-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REQ. REP.
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could violate § 7 merely because of the great economic power which would result
from the merger, even if the firms had no prior competitive relationship. Thus
it was argued that ITrs proposed merger with Hartford Fire violated § 7
primarily because "Hartford [was] a potential competitor of ITT in various fiels
by virtue of its excess surplus of approximately $400 million which could be used
to expand into other areas and that it had an active acquisition program which
came to a halt when it agreed to merge with ITT." 6 This radical extension of
the potential competition to include even the slightest possibility of competition
was founded upon a belief that large conglomerate corporations threatened
competition by their ability to deploy their vast financial resources wherever in
the corporate structure that the greatest gains could be realized and that such
deployment must produce anticompetitive effects somewhere "in numerous
though undesignated lines of commerce." s Therefore any merger between large
firms might be anticompetitive for § 7 purposes even without proof of anti-
competitive effects in specific product or geographic markets.
Though the District Court refused to accept such a radical departure from
the statutory language,79 it is not at all clear that its opinion reflects the spirit of
the Supreme Court's § 7 cases. That spirit had caused the Court initially to go
beyond the statutory language because it perceived a political need to interpret
competition so that it would serve the statute's political purpose of preventing
concentration and protecting small competitors. But if many competitors meant
more competition, there is no reason why a merger producing fewer competitors
in the economy as a whole might not violate § 7 as much as one producing fewer
competitors in a particular market. It is no objection that the statute does not
speak of the economy as a whole; it did not speak of competitors either.
IV. The Reaction: A New Antitrust Majority?
This final extension of § 7 has yet to be achieved. The Justice Department
lost each of its conglomerate cases and settlement before appeal deprived the
Supreme Court of an opportunity to explore the merits of the department's legal
theory."' Since then there has been evidence of a new antitrust spirit in the courts
which threatens to destroy the political basis for the Supreme Court's economics."'
Evidence of this new spirit appears in recent § 7 decisions by the Supreme Court's
45,069 at 52,715 (N.D.Ill. 1969); United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., [1961-1970
Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP. 45,069 at 52,712 (W.D.Pa. 1969).
76 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, 795 (D.Conn. 1969),
aff'd 324 F. Supp. 19 (D.Conn. 1970). See also United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 1066, 1096-97 (N.D.Ill. 1969).
77 See note 60 supra; see also E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECoNoMICs 259-69 (1968).
78 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 52 (D.Conn. 1970).
See also Donnem, supra note 74, ff 50,113, at 55,166-67.
79 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, 796 (D.Conn. 1969).
See also United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1096 (N.D.Ill. 169).
80 Obviously there are also political reasons for these settlements which may strip them of
legal significance. For the legal reasons see United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
349 F. Supp. 22 (D.Conn. 1972) (motion to set aside settlement denied); Remarks by Antitrust
Division's Donald Baker on . . . the ITT Settlement, No. 687 ATRR, p. El, E3 (11-5-75);
ITT Cases-White Paper, January 8, 1974, 5 TRADE REo. R P. 50,193 (1974).
81 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974),
where, on remand from the Supreme Court, the District Court refused to enjoin Falstaff's
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purportedly "new antitrust majority," 2 especially General Dynamics"3 and Marine
Bancorporation," which suggest the limits of § 7 for any court which has lost
Brown's vision of that section's political purpose. The recent decisions have ap-
plied the criteria established by the earlier § 7 cases, but have nonetheless upheld
mergers which surely violated the spirit of § 7 as proclaimed by those cases. The
new majority could do this because the Brown majority had been forced by §
7's language to devise its political test in economic terms. However the Brown
majority had ensured that those economic terms would serve its political purpose
by manipulating market data and concentration trends and by analyzing that
data with economic models which unduly abstracted from the commercial realities
of the markets the Court was evaluating. What the new antitrust majority did,
simply stated, was accept Brown's § 7 tests but apply them by carefully attending
to economic and commercial realities. Brown had suggested that this might be
done (though it did not do it) ;"5 Philadelphia National Bank insisted that where
undue economic concentration imminently threatened Brown's political ends, it
would be proper to dispense with detailed economic analysis' s
General Dynamics illustrates the new antitrust majority's analytical method.
There the Court upheld the merger of two coal companies, despite the Govern-
ment's claim that the coal industry was an oligopoly and that concentration in
the industry was increasing. On the authority of Philadelphia National Bank,
the Government argued that because § 7 was designed to prevent even slight in-
creases in concentration, the merger was obviously illegal."7 While it granted
that decisions since Brown had tended to find § 7 violations on the basis of con-
centration statistics alone, the Court recalled Brown's warning that market share
and concentration statistics should not be conclusive.8 Any intelligent analysis, the
Court insisted, must examine the reasons for concentration and the decline in the
number of competitors.8 This was precisely what the Court had rejected in
Philadelphia National Bank in order to effect Congress' desire to protect small
businesses.9" In General Dynamics the survey of economic evidence disclosed
that the number of competitors declined not because of acquisitions or unfair
merger with Narragansett and summarily rejected the government's claim that Falstaff had been
a potential competitor in the New England beer market, even on the basis of the "objective"
criteria set down by United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1972). Also
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S.
919 (1974).
82 The description is offered by Mr. Justice White, dissenting in United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 642 (1974).
83 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
84 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co.,-U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 392 (1974), which narrowly construed § 7's "in com-
merce" requirement.
85 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-22, 336 (1962). Compare United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449-56 (1964) ; United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 555-58 (N.D.Ill. 1972).
86 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963), and text
accompanying note 22 supra.
87 415 U.S. at 492-94, citing United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
365 n.2 (1963).
88 415 U.S. at 496-98, citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962).
89 415 U.S. at 499-500. Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote the General Dynamics opinion, had
forcefully argued this point in his dissent to United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,
289 (1966).
90 See text accompanying notes 22-24, 29-33, 69-70 supra.
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competitive practices but "as the inevitable result of the change in the nature of
the demand for coal."'" The Court then further separated itself from the spirit
of the earlier cases by rejecting their belief that a merger's incipient effects could
be assessed by projecting past trends into the future. Such projections reveal
nothing about probable "future ability to complete," the Court insisted, but that
is the only relevant consideration when evaluating incipient competitive effects.92
In Marine Bancorporation the Court suggested the relevance of its new
antitrust policy for potential competition doctrines. At issue was a merger
between a large Seattle bank and a medium-sized Spokane bank. The Govern-
ment challenged the merger because it eliminated the Seattle bank as a probable
entrant and thus eliminated the possibility that new entry might deconcentrate
the Spokane market. In upholding the merger the Court challenged the whole
basis of antitrust policy at least since Philadelphia National Bank.93 The Govern-
ment could use § 7 to preserve possibilities for deconcentration only if it proved
that such results were "realistically possible."9 To do so, the Government would
have to prove that (1) the acquiring firms had "an available feasible means" for
entering the market other than by the challenged acquisition and (2) those
means offered "a substantial likelihood of producing deconcentration of that
market and other procompetitive effects." 9 While these qualifications probably
more nearly reflect academic assumptions and commercial realities than did the
earlier potential competition cases, there is little doubt that by introducing them
the Court had, as the dissent emphasized, "chipped away" at the policies of § 7
by "dramatically escalat[ing] the burden of proving that the merger 'may be
substantially to lessen competition' ... .,"6 The minority clearly perceived that
the increased burden reflected more than an evidentiary issue; the Court had
dispensed with elaborate economic analysis in the past because only lower
standards of proof seemed to promote the political purpose of § 7.9" "In the last
analysis, one's view of this case, and the rules one devises for assessing whether
this merger should be barred, turns on the policy of § 7 of the Clayton Act to bar
mergers which may contribute to further concentration in the structure of Amer-
ican business." 8 It was that understanding of § 7's purpose which the new
majority questioned.
91 415 U.S. at 492-93, 506.
92 415 U.S. at 501-03. The Court's willingness to expand the relevant product market to
include all energy sources was important here, for two reasons: it reduced the concentration
ratios and it changed the nature of the competitive challenges faced by the coal companies.
See 415 U.S. at 492-93, 515. But see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th cir.
1972); Note, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 772, 780 (1973).
93 While the Court emphasized that it was dealing with the banking industry where there
were important regulatory barriers to entry which made it particularly difficult to apply
potential entrant theories, the logic of the Court's opinion suggests its greater relevance. This
relevance is especially emphasized by the excellent brief offered by the Comptroller of the
Currency in support of the merger. Brief for Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 53, at
62-90. It is nonetheless true that bank mergers have posed special problems for the Justice
Department. It has lost every potential competition bank merger case it has tried. See Robinson,
Antitrust Developments: 1974, 74 CoLUM. L. Ray. 163, 189 & n.162 (1974).
94 418 U.S. at 633. But see United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 544
(1973).
95 Id.
96 418 U.S. at 642.
97 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
98 418 U.S. at 653. Compare Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851,
859-60 (2d Cir. 1974).
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V. Conclusion
Now that a new antitrust majority has revealed its desire to transcend
Brown's limits, the time has come to restate the purposes of Clayton § 7. While
the new majority's efforts to make more commercially realistic judgments about
markets and competitive effects can diminish Brown's practical consequences,
they can hardly serve as the basis for a sound antitrust policy. To mention only
the most obvious difficulty: even the most thorough market analysis can be made
to prove anything or nothing. As the Justice Department's conglomerate com-
plaints well illustrate, "realistic" markets are bounded only by the imagination.
Rather than more realistically apply the old standards, the Court must attempt
a more realistic definition of § 7's purpose and political limits. No doubt the
Court may be tempted to depart from Brown only in order to establish more
realistic tests of a merger's effects on competition. While such tests would most
probably return the Court's attention from competitors to the statutory concern
with competition, they would not define that concern. The original statutory
concern reflected a belief that a competitive economy would provide the greatest
material progress, not only for small competitors but for everyone and that this
material progress would be conducive to the preservation of our political and
social institutions.' Yet it was obviously not a concern for material progress
which moved the Brown court. What lies at the roots of Brown's concern with
competitors who cannot effectively compete is the fear it expresses about whether
an efficient, competitive economy would in fact be socially and politically bene-
ficial if it necessarily created gigantic, irresponsible concentrations of capital.
This political fear is perhaps best reflected in Mr. Justice Douglas' lament for
the bygone "glories of Goldendale"-a small Washington town ravished by "men
on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and loss statements before
them to decide the fate of communities with which they have little or no rela-
tionship."' '1 To this fear economic analysis is simply irrelevant. If the new anti-
trust court hopes to develop a more commercially realistic antitrust policy, it must
articulate an effective response to these political and social concerns.
Stephen Wasinger
99 See text accompanying notes 74-79. Compare the District Court's market definition with
the Circuit Court's in Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines, 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.DY.
Okla. 1973), ret'd 1975 Trade Cases 60,127 '(10th Cir., filed Jan. 28, 1975).
100 See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) and note 16 supra.
101 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 541-43 (1972). Also: "A nation
of clerks is anathema to the American antitrust dream." Id. See United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535-36 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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